MOTORIST HAD STOP SIGN BUT BLAMES ACCIDENT ON OTHER CAR; CASE IS DISMISSED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Court: Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York

Case: Stefani A. Gallagher v. David E. McCurty

Date: June 28, 2011

From: New York attorney Gary E. Rosenberg (personal injury and accident attorney and lawyer; serving Brooklyn Queens Bronx; Queens Brooklyn accident injury lawyer)

Comment: The injured plaintiff here (Stefani A. Gallagher) had a stop sign. New York State's Vehicle and Traffic Law, Section 1172 (a), tell us that a stop sign means "stop." As a practical matter, a motorist stopped at a stop sign may have to wait there forever, but he or she may not go until the intersection is clear. If there's an accident, the fault is that of the motorist with the stop sign. Period.

I often get calls from motorists that have had accidents and tell me, "I stopped for the stop sign and proceeded slowly and carefully into the intersection and the other car was speeding, and came out of nowhere and hit my car." And I have to turn down the case because it can't win.

The case in this blog is a classic example of an injured motorist that had a stop sign and is blaming her accident no another car that she says was speeding. This case loses.

I often wonder why a lawyer takes a case like this and doesn't know better, wasting time and money and the court's time. I can only speculate the injured plaintiff in this case may have been seriously hurt, and her lawyers decided to take a chance.

NO "PERMISSIVE USE": CAR IN ACCIDENT DRIVEN WITHOUT PERMISSION, CAR OWNER (AND HER INSURANCE)  LET OUT OF ACCIDENT CASE  (Posted by Brooklyn injury attorney Gary E. Rosenberg on July 11, 2011)

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (DeStefano, J.), dated September 3, 2010, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured when, after stopping at a stop sign, she drove into an intersection where her vehicle was struck by a vehicle operated by the defendant. The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant, alleging negligence. The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, contending that the plaintiff's alleged negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. The Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion.

The defendant made a prima facie showing of his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting evidence that he entered the intersection with the right-of-way, and that, by failing to yield, the plaintiff violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a), which constituted negligence as a matter of law (see Thompson v. Schmitt, 74 A.D.3d 789, 902 N.Y.S.2d 606; McCain v. Larosa, 41 A.D.3d 792, 793, 838 N.Y.S.2d 663; Gergis v. Miccio, 39 A.D.3d 468, 834 N.Y.S.2d 253). As the driver with the right-of-way, the defendant "was entitled to anticipate that the plaintiff would obey traffic laws which required her to yield" (Yelder v. Walters, 64 A.D.3d 762, 764, 883 N.Y.S.2d 290; see Thompson v. Schmitt, 74 A.D.3d at 790, 902 N.Y.S.2d 606; Klein v. Crespo, 50 A.D.3d 745, 745-746, 855 N.Y.S.2d 633). In opposition, the plaintiff's contention that the defendant was traveling at an excessive rate of speed was conclusory and speculative, and, on this record, failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Thompson v. Schmitt, 74 A.D.3d at 790, 902 N.Y.S.2d 606; Yelder v. Walters, 64 A.D.3d at 765, 883 N.Y.S.2d 290; McCain v. Larosa, 41 A.D.3d at 793, 838 N.Y.S.2d 663).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.